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ARGUMENT

STOKES HAS BASED HER APPEAL ON SOUND LEGAL AND FACTUAL ARGUMENTS
AND SHOULD BE GRANTED THE RELIEF SHE HAS REQUESTED
An appellant is entitled to respond in a reply brief to any
new matter set forth in the opposing brief.
24(c).

In her opposing brief, defendant-appellee Mary J. Pulley

("Pulley") requests costs and attorney
entire

See Utah R. App. Pro.

appeal

is frivolous.

fees, arguing that the

Plaintiff-appellant

Christina R.

Stokes ("Stokes") is entitled to respond to this new matter and
each of the reasons given by Pulley as grounds for attorney fees.
An appeal is only frivolous if it is "not grounded in fact,
not warranted

by existing

law, or not based

on a good

faith

argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law." Utah R. App.
P. 33; see also Matter of Estate of Hamilton, 869 P.2d 971, 976
(Utah Ct. App. 1994); O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306, 309-310 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987) .

In contrast, Stokes has based her appeal on sound

legal and factual arguments which also require reversal of the
decision of the district court.
I.
Stokes May Raise Additional Issues in Her Brief that Were Not
Raised in the Docketing Statement.
Pulley argues that the first two issues on appeal should not
be

considered

statement.

because

they

were

not

raised

in the

docketing

Pulley relies on Dairyland Insurance Co. v. State Farm

Mutual Auto Insurance Co. , 882 P.2d

1143, 1144 n.l

(Utah 1994)

which is distinguishable and which has been superseded by Nelson by
and through Stuckman v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 572 (Utah
1996).

In Dairyland, the Utah Supreme Court refused to consider

issues raised by appellees who failed to file any notice of appeal
or docketing statement at all.

Unlike the appellees in Dairyland,

Stokes has filed a notice of appeal and a docketing statement.
More recently in Nelson, the Utah Supreme Court explicitly
held that failure to list all issues presented for review in the
docketing statement does not preclude an appellant from raising
them in her brief.

Id.

The appellant in Nelson had filed an

amended docketing statement, but the decision of the Court did not
turn

on

that

docketing
appellee."

fact.

statement
Id.

Rather,

the

Court

emphasized

that

"the

is for the benefit of the Court, not the

Since the docketing statement is not for the

benefit of the appellee, Pulley would suffer no prejudice if the
court were to entertain the first two issues on appeal.

In fact,

Pulley unexcusably ignores established precedent in making such an
argument.

Furthermore, in her original brief, Stokes requests direction
from the court, and offers to file an amended docketing statement
if

necessary.

If

the

court

decides

that

filing

an

amended

docketing statement is a prerequisite to raising additional issues
in her brief, it should give her an opportunity to do so.
II. Stokes Raised and Preserved in the Court Below Her First Two
Issues for Appeal.
Pulley also argues that the first two issues on appeal should
not be considered because they were not raised and preserved below.
Counsel

for Stokes raised

the first

issue with the

following

argument at trial:
. . . the second requirement is that [there
be] mutual acquiescence in the line as a
boundary.
Okay, so there's two elements of
this requirement, too.
There's
mutual
acquiescence, and in treating the line as a
boundary.
In the mutual acquiescence facet of it,
the way I interpret t h a t — I think [what's]
appropriate is that they both agree that
that's a boundary, or should be treated as a
boundary.
Now for years, I guess, that land was
owned by Pulleys on both sides of it, and it
didn't seem to ever become an argument as to
whether who owned what. . . .
(R. 550, 1. 8-19.)
In other words, counsel argued that the family relationship
between the property owners is an important factor to be considered
in the determination of mutual acquiesence.

He did not articulate

the issue as precisely as it would be later in the brief, and only
in that sense was the issue "implicitly raised."

Nevertheless, he

brought the issue to the attention of the trial court and provided
the court an opportunity to rule on its merits.
The second issue challenges the factual finding that mutual
acquiesence had occurred for the requisite time period.

Obviously

the issue was raised below since the court made a specific finding
that mutual acquiescence had occurred from "at least 1946 to 1 9 7 9 —
some 33 years."

(R. at 315).

A portion of that finding, regarding

the time period up to 1967, is not supported by the evidence, and
counsel

for

Stokes

raised

language cited above.

this

issue

at trial

with

the

same

Stokes also raised the general issue of

whether mutual acquiescence had occurred for the requisite time
period in various memoranda, including her Reply Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 102-101).
Pulley points out that counsel for Stokes stated in trial that
"it didn't seem to ever become an argument as to whether who owned
what."

It is apparent from the context that he meant there was no

mutual acquiesence because the property owners did not acknowledge
a

distinction

between

the

properties,

and

therefore

did

not

recognize the fence as a boundary.
III. Stokes Has Substantially Supported Her Argument for Applying
a Presumption of Nonacquiescence Between Family Members.
With regard to the first issue, Pulley

faults Stokes for

citing no authority from Utah or any other jurisdiction in favor of
her argument.
against it.

At the same time, Pulley fails to cite any authority
Since the issue has not come to the attention of most

appellate courts, it is especially suitable for appeal.

Stokes

provides substantial authority to support her argument to extend
existing law.
Pulley also points out that only she offered evidence at trial
regarding

acquiescence

in the

artificial

boundary.

This

has

nothing to do with the first issue, which is a question of law.
Also, this is to be expected since she had the burden of proof.
Finally, Pulley also faults Stokes for comparing the doctrines
of adverse possession and prescriptive easement to the doctrine of
boundary by acquiescence.

Pulley contrives a distinction between

the related doctrines that is simply specious.

Pulley argues that

boundary by acquiescence is a peaceful doctrine and that adverse
possession
However,

and

all

prescriptive

three

doctrines

easement
act

as

are

hostile

statutes

of

doctrines.
limitation,

discouraging disputes and encouraging peace and predictability by
limiting the time period in which a property owner may challenge
the rights of an adverse claimant.
In Jacobs v. Hafen. 14 Utah 2d 135, 137, 917 P.2d 1078, 1081
(1996), the Utah Supreme Court stated that the doctrine of boundary
by

acquiescence

limitations.

has

functioned

like

a

formal

statute

Also, in King v. Fronk, 378 P. 2d 893, 896

of
(Utah

1963), the Utah Supreme Court compared boundary by acquiesence to
"the concept of settling titles by prescription," explaining that
the philosophy behind both is that after some time a property owner
who never objects to the occupation of the property by another
loses the right to challenge that occupation.
the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence.

The same is true of
In Peters v. Juneau-

Douglas Girl Scout Council, 519 P.2d 826, 831-834 (Alaska 1974),
the Alaska Supreme Court explained that "the purpose of the various
requirements of adverse possession . . . is to put [the owner] on
notice of the hostile nature of the possession so that he, the
owner may take steps to vindicate his rights by legal action."

In

other words, all three doctrines assume that the property owner and
another who occupies the property have adverse claims that have
gone unlitigated for a long period of time.

It makes no sense to

call one doctrine peaceful and the others hostile.
In fact, the hostility requirement in adverse possession cases
is sometimes stated in terms of acquiescence.

For example, in

Peters, 519 P.2d at 832-833, a case often cited as an authority on
the hostility

requirement, the court explained

that

hostility

depends on "whether or not the claimant acted toward the land as if
he owned it," and then "[t]he whole doctrine of title by adverse
possession rests upon the acquiescence of the owner in the hostile
acts and claims of the person in possession."

Jd.

Thus, the

mutual acquiescence requirement in boundary by acquiescence and the
hostility

requirement

easement are the same.

in

adverse

possession

and

prescriptive

Both require acquiescence in the adverse

use of the property by another. Both are defeated by permissive
use, or nonacquiescence, where the party occupying the property
does so without claiming a right to it.
Therefore, the presumption of permissive use between family
members

in adverse possession

boundary by acquiescence cases.

cases

is just as applicable

in

When a family member occupies the

property of another up to an artificial boundary, it should be
presumed that she does so with permission and without claiming the
property for herself.
IV. Stokes Marshalled the Evidence and Properly Challenged the
Factual Determination of the Trial Court.
With regard to the second issue, Pulley primarily argues that
Stokes

failed

to marshall

the

evidence.

Pulley

argues

repeatedly as though she cannot emphasize it enough.

this

Apparently

Pulley mistakenly believes that an appellant must marshall the
evidence as she has done, in the appendix of the brief.
On the contrary, according to Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida

Cold

Storage, et al,, 872 P.2d 1051, 1052-53 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), the
authority cited by Pulley, an appellant only needs to present the
evidence

introduced

challenged.

at trial which supports the finding

being

This can be done in the body of the argument, as

Stokes has done.

Stokes presents the evidence supporting the

challenged finding, then the evidence contradicting the finding,
citing the record

along the way, then argues that the

latter

outweighs the former.
Stokes followed the example of the appellants in Mountain
States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
(see appendix), who were praised by the Utah Court of Appeals for
doing

"an

admirable

job

of

marshalling

the

evidence,"

and

supporting its challenges with "precise and thorough references to
record evidence."

Ld. at 554.

What Pulley calls "an attempt to

retry the matter" is actually a praiseworthy job of marshalling the
evidence.

Of course Pulley may marshall the evidence to present

evidence that she believes Stokes has

overlooked, but she has no

basis for arguing that Stokes failed to satisfy the marshalling
requirement.
Pulley

also

faults Stokes

authority on this issue.

for

failing to cite

any

legal

That should be no surprise since the

issue is challenging a finding of fact,
V.
Stokes Has Sufficiently
Adjoining Landowners.

Argued

that

the

Parties Are

Not

With regard to the final issue, Pulley again argues that
Stokes failed to marshall the evidence.

However, the final issue

is not challenging a finding of fact.

Instead, it challenges a

legal conclusion based on underlying facts that are not in dispute.
Pulley also criticizes Stokes for straining to define "adjoining
landowners"

and

for

failing

to cite Utah

authority.

Pulley,

however, also fails to present any dispositive authority.

She

argues that "adjoining" means "continguous" which itself is defined
as "adjoining."

Since the law is uncertain in this area, the issue

is suitable for appeal.
CONCLUSION
Stokes has supported her position with sound legal and factual
arguments and

is entitled

to reversal of the decision of the

district court as she has requested.

The arguments presented by

Pulley in opposition, including the reasons she gives for attorney

fees, are meritless, and should be disregarded by the court.
DATED this

J>

day of January, 1998.

HELEN H. ANDERSON, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Appellant
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MOUNTAIN STATES
BROADCASTING COMPANY,
a corporation, and DAN
LACY, an individual,
PlaintiffsAppellants,

Case No. 880192-CA

vs.
Category 14b
STERRETT NEALE and NEALE
BROADCAST ALLIANCE,
DefendantsRespondents.

AMENDED BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

AMENDMENT
This Amended Brief of Appellants amends and replaces the
Brief of Appellants dated November 20, 1987.
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The trial
trial.

court

entered

its judgment

after a non-jury

This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §

78-2-3(i) (1987).
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.
roneous?

Were the

findings of the trial

court

clearly er-

2.

Did

the

trial

court

err

in

failing

to

make

any

findings concerning plaintiffs' claim to recover extra payroll
expense incurred by reason of defendant's breach of contract,
and in failing to award plaintiff an offset for the amount of
those lost wages?
3.

Did

the

trial

findings concerning

court

err

in

failing

to

make

any

plaintiffs' claim to recover the $5,500

offset for the defective equipment plaintiffs were required to
give a subsequent purchaser by reason of defendant's breach of
contract, and in failing to award plaintiffs an offset for that
amount?
4.

Is cost of repair a proper measure of damages for

breach of warranty where the evidence established the equipment
could not be repaired?
5.

Where

the

promissory

note

provided

that

unpaid

interest payments would bear "like interest as the principal,"
and where the principal bore annual simple interest, was it
error to award interest compounded monthly?
6.

Were defendants entitled to an award of attorney's

fees where the plaintiffs were the prevailing parties?
1.

Did the trial court err in granting defendants' motion

to amend the judgment to provide for disbursal of funds on
deposit

to

Sterrett

Neale

without

affording

adequate time to file a response to the motion?

2

plaintiffs

an

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.
action

Nature of the Case,
to

determine

the

This is a declaratory judgment

amount

of

offset

plaintiffs

were

entitled to by reason of defendants1 breach of certain warranties

in

a

contract

for the

purchase

of

a

radio

station.

Defendants1 counterclaim sought damages and punitive damages by
reason of plaintiffs' failure to pay amounts due under the
contract.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Court Below.

This case was tried to the Court without a jury on September 1516, 1986.

Sterrett Neale was dismissed at the beginning of

trial (Tr. 2.)

The trial court entered its Memorandum Decision

on February 24, 1987, (R. 301-10) and Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law (R. 312-24) and a Judgment (R. 325-27) were
entered on March 24, 1987.

Plaintiffs filed a Motion for New

Trial or In the Alternative to Amend the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Judgment on March 30, 1987 (R. 328-29),
which motion was denied by ruling entered on April 15, 1987.
(R. 358-59.)
16, 1987.

Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal on April

(R. 363.)

Neale Broadcast Alliance filed a Notice of

Cross-Appeal on April 29, 1987.

(R. 377-78).

Prior to the filing of the Notice of Appeal, on April 6,
1987, defendants filed a motion seeking to amend the judgment to
allow disbursal of the funds on deposit to Neale.

The Order

granting the motion was signed and entered on April 7, and the
money was disbursed on April 15, 1987.
3

Plaintiffs filed a

motion to vacate the order and compel a return of the funds on
April 29.

(R. 380-81.)

on May 8, 1987.

The motion was denied by order entered

(R. 392-93.)

Plaintiffs filed a Notice of

Appeal from that order on June 5, 1987.
Plaintiffs also filed a Petition for a Writ of Mandamus
seeking the same relief on or about June 4. 1987.
870206.)

The petition was denied on July 13, 1987.

C.
Company

(Case No.

Statement

of Facts.

("Mountain States")

Mountain

States

Broadcasting

is a corporation which

operates

radio stations, and in addition purchases and resells radio
stations.

In 1981, Mountain States was informed by a broker

that an AM/FM radio station in Spanish Fork, Utah, was for sale.
(Tr. 27.)

The station, known as KONI (AM) and KTMP (FM) , had

been owned and operated by defendant Neale Broadcast Alliance
("Neale Broadcast") since 1977.

(Tr. 220, 536.)

States determined to purchase the station.

Mountain

(Tr. 28.)

Dan Lacy, president of Mountain States, had a very brief
opportunity to glance through the station prior to closing, and
noted that some equipment was not working

(Tr. 29) , and also

learned that there were engineering problems which could be
heard on the air.

(Tr. 30-31.)

Lacy wanted to delay the

closing in order to allow the needed repairs to be made, but
Neale Broadcast represented that it would be forced to file
bankruptcy if closing did not occur as scheduled.

(Tr. 145.)

In order to avoid the additional problems that would be engendered

by a bankruptcy

filing, Mountain
4

States agreed to

proceed to closing without waiting for the repairs to be made.
(Tr. 38-39.)

Closing occurred on June 29-30, 1984.

(Tr. 34.)

The Asset Purchase Agreement executed at closing included a
warranty that the transmitting and studio equipment were in good
repair and working order.

(Exhibit 1, page 9, at paragraph

4.2.3.)

In response to plaintiffs' concerns about the quality

of

equipment,

the

Neale

Broadcast

connection with the closing that

further

acknowledged

in

ff

[c]ertain of said equipment is

not in [good operating] condition11 and that Neale Broadcast had
an obligation to repair or replace the defective equipment.
(Exhibit 6.)
Lacy returned to the station the evening of closing (June
30,

1984) and

missing

conducted

or not working,

a detailed
using

inventory

of the

as a reference

the

inventory which was part of the Asset Sale Agreement.
Exhibit 17.)

items

list of
(Tr. 40;

He discovered numerous items which were either

missing or inoperable. (Tr. 40-42; Exhibits 19, 20.)
Due

to

Federal

Communications

Commission

regulations,

plaintiffs could not sell commercials on the AM portion of the
station, but were nonetheless required to keep it on the air.
(Tr. 45-46.)
had

the

Plaintiffs had contemplated that they would, and

equipment

been

operating would

have been

able to,

operate the AM portion of the station using the automation
equipment which was purchased with the station.
154-55.)

(Tr. 49-50, 63,

The automation equipment did not, however, operate

with any degree of reliability, and the trial court properly
5

found that it was not in good operating condition at the time of
the transfer. (R. 316, para. 14.)
Because the automation equipment did not work, plaintiffs
were required to hire extra personnel to operate the AM portion
of the station, at a total expense of $3,355.07.

(Tr. 151-53;

Exhibit 16.)
Plaintiffs were subsequently able to sell the AM portion
of the station to SACE Broadcasting, the principal of which was
Chris Warden.

The sale price according to the sale contract was

$225,000.00, but plaintiffs were required to allow an additional
offset of $5,500.00 because they could not comply with the same
warranties concerning the condition of the equipment as Neale
Broadcast had made to plaintiffs.

(Tr. 59-60.)

Plaintiffs had

purchased the AM portion of the station from Neale Broadcast for
$250,000.00. (Tr. 60.)

Plaintiffs therefore incurred a loss of

$30,500.00 on the sale of the AM portion of the station to SACE
Broadcasting.
Subsequent to the closing on June 30, 1984, and after Lacy
had conducted his detailed inventory of the assets, plaintiffs
made demand on Neale Broadcast to repair or replace the nonfunctional

and

missing

items.

(Tr.

46-49;

Exhibit

7-9.)

(Detailed discussion of the evidence relating to the specific
items claimed to be missing or not working
connection

with

the

argument.)

When

is presented in

the demands were not

honored, Mountain States brought this action for a declaration
of its right to an offset against the purchase price and for an
6

injunction against actions by defendant which plaintiffs alleged
were preventing the resale of the station.
In connection with

filing this action, Mountain States

deposited a check for $89,587.16 into court, and obtained an
Order to Show Cause directing the defendants to show cause why
they should not be enjoined from interfering with the resale of
the radio station and further restrained from foreclosing their
mortgage on the real property.

At the hearing on the Order to

Show Cause, the parties settled the issues pending trial by
agreeing

to

the

following:

Plaintiffs

were

permitted

to

withdraw the check for $89,587.16, and in exchange paid the sum
of

$59,587.16

to

defendants

$30,000.00 into court.1

and

redeposited

the

sum

of

Plaintiffs were also directed to

deposit an additional $15,000.00 as a bond for attorney's fees.2
Defendants deposited a Certificate of Deposit for $10,000.00 as
a bond for attorney's fees.

Defendants further agreed to not

interfere with the resale of the station.

(R. 33-35.)

This matter was tried before the court, without a jury, on
September 15-16, 1986.

The court took the matter under advise-

ment and entered its memorandum decision on February 24, 1987.
Formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a judgment
1

The $59,587.16 was paid to defendants on or about May
31, 1983, shortly after the Order to Show Cause hearing. The
$30,000.00 was deposited and the $89,587.16 check withdrawn on
or about July 24, 1984.
2

Plaintiffs posted the $15,000.00 deposit on or about May
15, 1987, subsequent to the trial and the filing of the Notice
of Appeal.
7

were entered on March 24, 1987.
pursuant

to Rule

Plaintiffs' post-trial motions

59 were denied,

and plaintiffs

thereafter

perfected this appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court's findings are contrary to the great weight
of the evidence.

The court found several items of equipment to

be functional notwithstanding testimony from defense witnesses
that the items were non-functional.

Defense witnesses similarly

established that several items were missing, contrary to the
findings of the court.
The trial court erroneously used cost of repair as the
measure of damages for the Control Design brain, notwithstanding
evidence that it was not repairable.
Given the trial court's finding that the brain was inoperable, it was error for the court to fail to award plaintiffs
the extra payroll expense incurred by reason of defendant's
breach of that portion of the contract.

The trial court further

erred in failing to award plaintiffs an offset for the $5,500.00
credit plaintiffs had to allow a subsequent purchaser by reason
of the defective equipment.
Plaintiffs were the prevailing party in the court below,
because they had acknowledged an obligation to pay the amounts
tendered into court less whatever offsets were determined by the
court.

The court therefore erred in awarding attorneys' fees to

the defendants.

8

The promissory note in question did not provide for the
compounding of interest, but only for annual interest.
Finally, because the money which had been deposited in
court was improperly paid out to Sterrett Neale, any judgment
rendered

on

remand

should

also

be

against

Sterrett

Neale

personally.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS WITH RESPECT TO
MISSING AND DEFECTIVE EQUIPMENT WERE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
A.
of

the

Introduction and Standard of Review.
Asset

Purchase

Agreement,

Neale

Under the terms

Broadcast

sold

and

Mountain States purchased, among other things, the following:
The furniture, fixtures, machinery, equipment (including the transmitter, antenna, ground system and
other equipment), supplies, spare parts, inventory and
all other tangible personal property owned by Seller
and used or useful in the operation of the Stations,
as described in Schedule 2 (attached) together with
any replacements thereof or additions thereto made
between the date hereof and the Closing Date.
Exhibit 1, page 2, paragraph 2.1.1.
The Schedule 2 referred to in the above provision contained
a detailed list of all the personal property, categorized in
seven main groups:

transmitting equipment,8

AM studio equip-

ment, FM studio equipment, office equipment, AM vehicles, FM
vehicles, and

shop tools and test

3

equipment.

(Exhibit

1,

Schedule 2 does not contain the label of "transmitting
equipment" but the transmitting equipment is listed together in
one group on the first page of Schedule 2.
9

Schedule 2 (copy attached as Appendix G) .)

The Asset Purchase

Agreement further contained the following warranties:
As of the Closing Date, all of the personal property
listed in Schedule 2 which is presently in active use
in the operation of the Stations will be in good
repair and working order, unless otherwise noted on
Schedule 2.
The transmitting and studio equipment
for the stations which are among the physical assets
listed in Schedule 2 are in good repair and working
order.
In the event that such equipment is not in
good repair and working order and/or does not comply
with FCC requirements Seller agrees at its own expense
to pay the cost of making such repairs or at its
option, of installing such new equipment, as may be
necessary to meet those standards as of the Closing
Date.
Exhibit 1 at page 9, paragraph 4.2.3.
By this warranty, therefore, Neale Broadcast warranted that
all of the transmitting and studio equipment (the first three
categories on Schedule 2) were in good repair and working order.
This warranty was not limited to only those items of transmitting and studio equipment in active use.

With respect to all

other assets listed on Schedule 2, however, the warranty was
limited to only those items presently in active use in the
operation of the stations.
Paragraph 6.2.1

of the Asset Purchase Agreement further

provided that Neale Broadcast would indemnify Mountain States
for "any and all damage or deficiency resulting from any . . .
material breach of warranty . . . .M

Paragraph 6.2.3 provided

that Mountain States was entitled to set off any amount to which
it was entitled

to indemnification

against the

indebtedness

evidenced by the Promissory Note, if Mountain States had first

10

made

demand

for

indemnification

which

demand

had

not

been

honored by Neale Broadcast.
Plaintiffs claimed that at least 23 items of equipment
valued at least $11,500.73 and included on the Asset Purchase
Agreement were missing when Mountain States took over on July 1,
1982 (Exhibit 19), and that at least 20 additional items were
not working, for an additional lost value of $40,566.71 (Exhibit
20) .

The claim of missing and inoperative equipment was based

on an inventory Lacy performed on June 30, 1982, after the
closing but prior to the time the Mountain States took over.
(Tr. 40.)

In that inventory, Lacy had compared what he could

find in the station against the inventory list on Schedule 2 of
Exhibit 1.
The trial court found that "there were no material items
missing" (R. 316, paragraph 15), and that the only items which
were not in good repair and working order were a Control Design
brain, which the court found would cost $3,000.00 to repair, and
two carrousels, which the court found would cost $1,500.00 each
to repair.

(R. 304, paragraph 14.)

The court accordingly

allowed a total offset of $6,000.00 against the purchase price.
Mountain States respectfully asserts, for the reasons set
forth in detail below, that the trial courtfs findings with
respect

to

erroneous.

missing
Mountain

and

inoperable

States

equipment

acknowledges

are

clearly

its obligation

to

marshall all the evidence concerning the contested findings,
including that favorable to Neale Broadcast.

11

Scharf v. BMG

Corp,, 700 P.2d

1068, 1070

(Utah 1985).

This court should

reverse the judgment of the trial court, if, after examining all
of the evidence in the record, it appears that those findings
"are

against

the

clear weight

of

the evidence,

or

if the

appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made . . . .ff State v. Walker. 743 P.2d
191, 193 (Utah 1987).
B.

Missing Equipment.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 19, a copy of

which is attached as Appendix J, set forth 23 items of equipment
which plaintiff claimed were missing as of July 1, 1982.

The

trial court found that there are no material items missing.
Plaintiff acknowledges that there was a genuine dispute in the
evidence as to many of the items set forth on Exhibit 19, and
that there is an adequate evidentiary support for the court's
findings with respect to those items.

With respect to at least

five items of Exhibit 19, however, the court's finding is not
supported by the evidence.

These five items, and the value for

each, are an oscilloscope ($120.00), Ampex Play-Back electronics
($2,000.00), tape pre-amps ($178.05), stereo heads ($221.64) and
noise and distortion meter ($377.80).

The total of these is

$2,897.49.
Two oscilloscopes are listed on Schedule 2, one on page 1
as part of the transmitting equipment, and another on the bottom
of page 2 as part of the AM

studio equipment.

There was

testimony that the oscilloscope which was part of the transmitting equipment was not missing, but was located at the FM trans12

mitting site on a mountain.

(Tr. 478-79, 495.)

With respect to

the other oscilloscope, valued at $120.00, even defendant's
witness testified that it was missing.

(Exhibit 69, page 2,

paragraph (1).)
Defendant's witness similarly acknowledged that the noise
and distortion meter, valued at $377.80, was missing.

(Tr. 280,

562) .
The remaining three items are the Ampex Play-Back electronics, and the tape pre-amps and stereo heads which were a part
of it.

Dan Lacy testified that they could not be located when

he took an inventory on June 30, 1982.

(Tr. 41.)

George

Culbertson, a defense witness and former owner of the stations,
testified that the equipment could not be located when he took
an

inventory

paragraph
these

on

(6).)

items were

December

12, 1983.

(Exhibit

69, Page 2,

Mr. Culbertson further noted, however, that
out

of

service.

They

are

Schedule 2 by asterisk as being "not in use".

identified

on

The fact that

these items were not in use does not, however, vitiate Neale
Broadcast's express warranty that they would be present in the
station and would be operable.

These items are included on

Schedule 2 as part of the transmitting and studio equipment.
Neale Broadcast made an unconditional warranty that those items
which comprised the transmitting and studio equipment would be
in good repair and working order.

The undisputed

evidence

before the court was that the Ampex Play-Back electronics and
the associated tape pre-amps and stereo heads were missing, and
13

plaintiffs should have been allowed an offset for the value of
those items.
C.

Inoperable Equipment.

Dan Lacy testified that each of

the 20 items listed on plaintiffs1 Exhibit 20 were inoperable on
July 1, 1984, the date Mountain States assumed operation of the
stations.

(Tr. 42.)

The trial court found that the only items

of equipment not in good repair and working order were the
Control Design brain and two of the carrousels.

The discussion

below establishes that the court's finding was clearly erroneous
and against the great weight of the evidence with respect to at
least

one additional

carrousel

and the

items designated

as

cartel and Magnecord recorder.
The cartel, a high speed random selection carrousel-type
piece of equipment which played tape cartridges ("carts"), was
valued at $2,498.53.
on June 30, 1984.

Dan Lacy testified that it was inoperable

(Tr. 42.)

Defendant's own witness, Malcolm

Crawford, also testified that the cartel was inoperable and had
been retired from active use.
contrary testimony.

(Tr. 488-89.)

There was no

The cartel was part of the AM

studio

equipment, and was accordingly warranted to be in good repair
and working order regardless of whether it was in active use in
the station.
The

defense

witnesses

acknowledged

that

the

recorder, valued at $834.26, was not functioning.
The Magnecord

recorder was not

Magnecord
(R. 494.)

in use at the time of the

purchase but was part of the FM studio equipment listed on
14

Schedule 2 and accordingly was part of the express warranty that
it would be in good repair and working order.
Plaintiffs

testified

that

all

six

included in the sale were inoperable.

(See Tr. 551.)

carousel

which

were

The record and playback

heads had been removed from some of the carrousels

(Tr. 81,

132), and various other problems rendered most of the other
carrousels inoperable.

(E.g.. Tr. 299, 320, 596.)

Even Malcolm

Crawford, a defense witness who was an engineer and worked at
the station until the time of transfer, testified that only
three

of

six

carrousels

were

functional.

(Tr.

472, 485)

Defendant Sterrett Neale testified that he did not know whether
the carrousels were operable at the time of transfer.
537.)

(Tr.

The only testimony which would even remotely support a

finding that only two of the carrousels were functional was that
of Mike Smith, a defense witness who worked at the station as an
announcer.

He stated that, as far as he could recall, all seven

of the carrousels (including the cartel), were in use and functional at the time of transfer in June, 1982.

(Tr. 420.)

This

statement was contrary to all other evidence presented, and
clearly the great weight of the evidence was that no more than
three carrousels were functioning.

The trial court1s finding

that five carrousels were functioning (i.e., only two carrousels
were non-functional) is clearly erroneous.
Plaintiff should be allowed an additional offset of at
least $1,500.00, the amount found by the court to repair a
carrousel,

and

in

addition

for
15

the

value

of

the

cartel

($2,498.53) and Magnecord recorder

($834.26).

The total of

these items is $4,832.79.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING COST OF
REPAIR FOR THE CONTROL DESIGN BRAIN RATHER THAN
COST OF REPLACEMENT
The

trial

court

found

that

the

Control

Design

brain

("brain") was not in good repair and working order at the time
of the transfer.

The court further found that the estimated

cost of repair to the brain was $2,000.00 to $3,000.00, plus
parts, and accordingly found the cost of repair to be $3,000.00.
(R. 316, paragraph 14.)
Plaintiffs are not aware of any evidentiary support for the
finding that it would cost $2,000.00 to $3,000.00 plus parts to
repair the brain.

Although

some

of the defense

witnesses

testified that the brain functioned properly, the trial court
clearly discounted that testimony in determining that the brain
did not function properly.
knowledged

that

the

brain

Those defense witnesses who acdid

not

testified that it was not repairable.

function

properly

also

George Culbertson, the

former owner of the stations, testified that he, in conjunction
with a representative of the manufacturer, had attempted to
repair the brain without success.

(Tr. 262-63.)

Although cost of repair is typically an appropriate measure
of damages, it is not appropriate when the item in question can
not be repaired.

See Ault v. Dubois, 739 P.2d 1117, 1122 n.7

(Utah App. 1987).

Plaintiffs established that the value of the
16

automation equipment was $25,000.00 to $35,000.00.

(Tr. 72,

189.)

(Exhibit

The initial cost of the brain was $13,104.05.

1, Schedule 2.)
Having found that the brain was nonfunctional and where the
evidence clearly showed that the brain was not repairable, the
trial

court

should

have

awarded

an

offset

of

at

least

$25,000.00 for the Control Design brain.
POINT III
PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED TO RECOVER THE EXTRA
PAYROLL EXPENSE INCURRED BY REASON OF THE
INOPERABLE CONDITION OF THE BRAIN.
The trial court properly found that the Control Design
brain was inoperable at the time plaintiffs purchased the radio
stations from Neale Broadcast.
Agreement,

plaintiffs

were

Pursuant to the Asset Purchase

accordingly

entitled

to

offset

against the purchase price "any and all damage or deficiency
resulting from any . . . material breach of warranty . . . .fl
(Exhibit 1, paragraphs 6.2.1 & 6.2.3.)

In partial compliance

with

trial

this

contractual

provision,

the

court

allowed

plaintiffs an offset for the cost of repairing the brain.

The

court failed, however, to also award plaintiffs their damages
incurred by reason of the inoperable condition of the brain.
Undisputed evidence at trial established that plaintiffs
had contemplated when they purchased the radio stations that
they would be able to operate the AM portion of the station
using the brain and the other automation equipment which was
part of the sale.

Had the brain been functioning, plaintiffs
17

would have been able to so operate the station.

Because the

brain did not function properly, plaintiffs were required to
hire

additional

personnel,

at

a

total

additional

$3,355.07, in order to operate the station.

cost

of

The trial court

erred in failing to award plaintiffs an offset for that amount.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
AWARD PLAINTIFFS THE LOSS THEY
INCURRED ON RESALE OF THE STATION
BY REASON OF DEFENDANTS' BREACH OF
CONTRACT.

Plaintiffs purchased the AM portion of the station from
Neale Broadcast for $250,000.00, and subsequently resold that
portion of the station to SACE Broadcasting for $225,000.00.
(Tr. 60.). Plaintiffs made the same warranty to SACE Broadcasting concerning the condition of the equipment as Neale Broadcast
had made to plaintiffs.

Because Neale Broadcast did not honor

its warranty to plaintiffs, plaintiffs accordingly were unable
to comply with their warranty to SACE Broadcasting, and accordingly were required to allow an additional offset of $5,500.00
against the purchase price of $225,000.00.

(Id.)

Neale Broadcast offered no evidence to controvert the fact
that plaintiffs were required to allow the additional $5,500.00
offset by reason of Neale Broadcast's breach of its warranty.
The trial court erred in failing to allow plaintiffs to assert
this additional

offset

against

the purchase price to Neale

Broadcast pursuant to paragraph
Agreement.
18

6.2.3

of the Asset Purchase

POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN COMPOUNDING INTEREST
MONTHLY, WHERE THE PROMISSORY NOTE ONLY
PROVIDED FOR SIMPLE INTEREST.
The

promissory

note

signed

by

plaintiffs

included

the

following paragraph:
This Note shall bear interest upon the unpaid
principal balance hereof from the date hereof until
paid, at a rate of ten percent (10%) per annum. Should
interest not be paid when due, it shall thereafter
bear like interest as the principal.
Exhibit 2.
Defendant

asserted

and the trial court held that this

provision required that interest be compounded monthly.

(R.

314, paragraph 6.)
Compound interest is not favored in the law, and will not
be awarded

unless clearly

required by contract

or statute.

Watkins & Farber v. Whitelev, 592 P.2d 613 (Utah 1979); Xebek,
Inc. v. Nickum & Spauldincr Associates, Inc., 43 Wash. App. 740,
718 P.2d 851 (1986).

The contract in this case does not clearly

provide for compound interest.

An example of a contract using

similar language, but with a modification which provided for
compound interest, is found in First American Title Insurance &
Trust Co. v. Cook, 12 Cal. App. 3d 592, 90 Cal. Rptr. 645
(1973).

The contract in that case provided that " [s]hould the

interest not be so paid it shall be added to the principal and
thereafter bear like interest as the principal.11
at 646 (emphasis added).

90 Cal. Rptr.

The court held the contract to provide

for compound interest.
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The

contract

in

the

instant

case,

in

contrast,

only

provides that unpaid interest payments shall bear Hlike interest
as the principal."

The principal bears simple, not compound,

interest.

interest

Unpaid

payments

therefore

bear

simple

interest only, not interest compounded monthly.
This rule is further supported by the case of Xebek, Inc.
v. Nickum & Spauldina Associates. Inc., 43 Wash. App. 740, 718
P.2d 851 (1986).

The contract in that case provided as follows:

Payment shall be made within thirty (30)
days after receipt of billing by REDRI.
Late charges of li per month shall be
applied to all billings which have not been
paid within thirty (30) days after receipt.
718 P.2d at 853.
Even thought this contract provided for monthly interest on
the entire amount of the unpaid billings, the court nonetheless
held that "this language is not explicit enough so as to warrant
as award of compound
instant

case

similarly

interest."

Id.

The language in the

does not explicitly

provide

for the

monthly compounding of interest, and the trial court erred in so
holding.
POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING
ATTORNEY'S FEES TO DEFENDANT WHERE
PLAINTIFFS WERE THE PREVAILING PARTY,
The trial court held that both parties had breached the
contract, and accordingly awarded attorneys fees to each party.
The recent case of Elder v. Triax Co.. 740 P.2d 1320 (Utah
1987), however, appears to hold that there can be only one
20

prevailing party in an action, even where the plaintiff is
awarded relief on its claim and defendant is awarded relief on
its counterclaim.

It is clear in this action that plaintiff was

the prevailing party.
In conjunction with filing their complaint herein, plaintiffs

tendered

into

court

the

sum

of

$89,587.16,

thereby

acknowledging their obligation to pay to defendant the full
amount owing under the contract, less such offsets as the court
would allow.

(R. 1-4; 47-51.)

Defendants' counterclaim alleged

that plaintiffs were in breach of the agreements by failing to
make payments as required, and also alleged that the failure to
make payments was malicious justifying an award of punitive
damages.

(R. 64-67.)

The judgment of the court awarded plaintiffs judgment on
their claims.
offset.

Plaintiffs were found to be entitled

Although

the

court

purported

to

also

give

to an
Neale

Broadcast judgment on its counterclaim, Neale Broadcast really
recovered nothing more than what plaintiffs had acknowledged
from the beginning Neale Broadcast was entitled to receive—the
amount

due under

the promissory

determined by the court.

note

less such offsets as

The court denied defendants' claim for

an award of punitive damages.
Because

plaintiffs

were

the

prevailing

parties

in the

litigation, therefore, plaintiffs were entitled to recover their
attorney's fees, and it was error to award any attorneys fees to
defendant.
21

POINT VII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RELEASING TO
STERRETT NEALE THE MONEY PREVIOUSLY
DEPOSITED IN COURT BY PLAINTIFFS.
The judgment entered by the trial court on March 24, 1987,
provided that the money then held on deposit by the court clerk
was to be released to the "defendant.,f

(R. 326 para. 5.)

The

only defendant listed on the pleading heading for the judgment
was Neale Broadcast Alliance.
pleading titled

On April 6, defendants filed a

"Motion," which sought to have the judgment

amended to provide that the funds on deposit be released to
Sterrett

Neale,

security number.

and

also

to

(R. 354-55.)

set

forth

Mr.

Neale1s

social

A proposed Order accompanied the

Motion, and it was signed by the court and entered the following
day, April 7.

(R. 356-57.)

Plaintiffs had not yet had an

opportunity to respond to the motion, and were not given any
notice of the entry of the order.

See Utah R. Civ. P. 77(d).

On April 15, 1987, Sterrett Neale withdrew $37,238.77 and a
certificate of deposit with a face amount of $10,000.00 from the
court.

(R. 361-62.)

On April 16, 1987, plaintiffs filed and served their (1)
Notice of Appeal (R. 363-64), (2) Motion for Stay or Injunction
Pending Appeal and to Set Amount of Supersedeas Bond (R. 36566), and

(3) Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs1 Motion for

Stay or Injunction Pending Appeal and to Set Amount of Supersedeas Bond and in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Release
of Funds on Deposit.

(R. 367-69.)
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Plaintiffs sought in the

motion

and

memorandum

to

have

the

funds

which

plaintiffs

supposed were still on deposit serve as a supersedeas bond
pending this appeal.

Plaintiffs did not discover until after

the filing of the motion and memorandum that the funds had
already been disbursed.
Rule 2.8 of the Rules of Practice in the District Courts
and Circuit Courts of the State of Utah grants a period of ten
days to respond to any motion except an ex parte or uncontested
matter.

Rule 6(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides

for an additional three days where the motion is served by mail.
Defendants1 motion was served on April 4.
was filed on April

Plaintiffs9 response

16, and was clearly timely.

The trial

court's signing of the order without allowing plaintiffs the
specified time to respond was clearly improper.
Defendants assert that the motion merely sought to correct
a clerical error in the judgment, and that service of the motion
was not required.
however, did

The proposed amendment

not just

add Sterrett

to the judgment,

Neale's

social

security

number, but changed the payee of the judgment.
Neale Broadcast Alliance was formally dissolved in October,
1982.

(R. 313, para. 3.)

appeal

and

judgment

If plaintiffs are successful on this

entered

against Neale Broadcast,

it is

probable that the corporate shell will have no assets.
Plaintiffs acknowledge that this Court cannot undo the
wrongful release of the deposit.

The money has already been

disbursed.

however,

This

Court

should,
23

provide

that

any

judgment entered on remand is enforceable against Sterrett Neale
to the extent of the funds wrongfully disbursed to him.
CONCLUSION
The findings of the trial court were contrary to the great
weight of the evidence.

The court failed to allow plaintiffs an

offset for equipment which was undisputedly missing and valued
at a total of $2,897.49, and for equipment which was undisputedly inoperable and valued at a total of $4,832.79.

Plain-

tiffs were further entitled, based on undisputed evidence, to an
additional

offset

of

$3,355.07

for

extra

payroll

expense

incurred by reason of the defective equipment, and $5,500.00 for
a loss incurred on resale of the station which was directly
attributable to defendants' breach of the warranties concerning
the

equipment.

The trial

court

further

erred

in awarding

plaintiffs an offset of only $3,000.00 for the repair cost of
the brain, where the evidence established that the brain was not
repairable.

The value of the brain was at least $25,000.00, so

plaintiffs were entitled to an additional offset of at least
$22,000.00.

Plaintiffs were accordingly entitled to a total

additional offset of at least $38,585.35.
Plaintiffs were the prevailing party and it was error to
award attorney's fees to defendant.

The trial court further

erred in awarding compound interest.
This case should be remanded with directions to the trial
court

to allow

an additional

offset

24

of

$38,585.35, and to

reverse the portions of the judgment allowing defendants their
attorney's fees and compound interest.
DATED this

2 6^ day of January, 1988.
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